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THE KANSAS MORTGAGE CASES.

How Far Can a State Legislature Affect Prior Contracts
by an Alteration of the Remedy Provided?

Thesis Submitted in Competition for the Law School Prize

By Alexander Otis.
Cornell University, 1 97.
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THE KANSAS MORTGAGE CASES.

The most important case recently decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, excepting perhaps the matter of
the income tax, is that of Beverly against .Barnitz, 163 U.
S. 1l8,reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, reported in 55 Kansas 478. Under the pretense of regulating and altering the proceedings by which mortgages
were foreclosed, the Kansas legislature so embarassed mortgagees by adverse legislation that the value of' their securities was seriously diminished.
In the early days of our constitutional history the le;islature was declared to have the power to affect contracts
by changing the remedy upon them. The obligation of the
contract and the remedy were held to be distinct. But although this supposed distinction has played its part in the
litigation of three quarters of a century, it has not been
the main issue in an important case for over fifty years.
The Supreme Caurt of Kansas, in an opinion by Judge Martift, defended its views with singular ability; and the Supreme Court of the United States, while it reversed the docision of the court below, did not attempt to meet many of

the arguments presented, nor absolutely to close the door
against a revival of the discussion in future litigation.
Many jurists are of the opinion that the doctrine of the
Kansas court is far from being unsound.
These considerations have induced the writer to attempt
a thorough investigation of the problem: "How far may a
state affect the rights of contracting parties by an alteration of the remedy existing at the daite of the contract?"
As a result of this inquiry an attempt will be madelto
establish the proposition that the substantial rights of
the creditor cannot be lessened by such legislation. In conclusion an effort will be made to solve the further problem
presented by the case of Beverly against Barnitz: "Is a
mortgage contract so merged in the decree of foreclosure
and sale that the rights of purchasers thereunder may be
affected by adverse legislation without impairing the mortgage contract?"

LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER CONTRACTS.
The interpreters of the Constitution discovered at an
early day that a literal application of the prohibition
upon laws impairing the obligation of contracts would in
many ways deprive the states of sovereign powers essential
to the existence of any government. It wais evident that the
framers of the Constitution could not have intended such a
result. JudtjeeMarshall and his compeers soon came to recognize five distinct cases in which state laws might affect
contracts. These have been classified by writers on constitutional law as follows:
1 By the exercise of the Police Power.
2 By the exercise of the Taxing Power.
3 By the Power of Eminent Domain.
4 By laws curing defects in contracts.
5 By laws affecting the remedy upon contracts.
Under the Police Power immoral contracts may be nullified and all remedy denied; under the Taxing Power the value of various classes of choses in action may be" seridusly
diminished; under the Power of Eminent Domain corporate
franchises may be condemned,--West River Bridge Company
against Dix, 6 Howard 5,57; and under the power to cure defects invalid contracts may be made enforcible by subse-

4

quent legislation.
We think it

can be showvn that many instances of the sup-

posed exercise of an authority to alter the remedy to the
detriment of creditors are properly attributable

to the

exercise of one of the other legislative powers above enumerated.

HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIO'.
Curiously enough the problem before us was foreshadowed
in the first reported discussion of this clause in the Constitution. By referring to "Debates on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, as Reported by James Madison", Elliott's Debates, Vol. V, at page 485, will be found the following:
Mr. King moved to add in the words used in the ordinance
of Congress establishing new states, a prohibition upon the
states to interfere in private contracts.
Gouverneur Morris: "This would be going too far. There
are a thousand lawts relating to bringing actions, limita-tion of actions, etc., which affect contracts. The judicial
power of the United States will be a protection within theirjurisdiction and within the state itself a majority must
rule, whatever be the mischief done among themselves.

#-

r

Mr. Madison admitted that inconveniences night arise from
such a prohibition but thought on the whole it would be
overbalanced by the utility of it.

le conceived, however,

that a negative upon state laws could alone secure the effect. Evasions might be devised by the ingenuity of state
legislatures.
Col. Mason:

"This is carrying the restraint too far.

Cases will happen that cannot be foreseen, where some kind
of interference will be proper and essential." He mentioned
the cases of limiting actions on an open account--that of
bonds after a certain lapse of time, risking whether it was
proper to tie the hands of the states from making provisions
in such cases.
Mr. Wilson: "The answer to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited."
Mr. Madison: "Is that not already done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws which .iill oblige the judges to
declare such interferences null and void?"
It will be noted incidentally that ex pbst facto laws
were regarded by Madison as covering civil as well as criminal matters. The restricted meaning placed upon the phrase
by the Supreme Court was frankly admitted to be erroneous by
Justice Washington--Ogden against Sanders, 12 Wheaton at
page 286, citing Shep. Touch. 68, 70, 73, but it was too
late to change.
In the debates ,-ihich preceded the adoption of the Constitution, the contract clause seems to have provoked but
little discussion compared with its importance. It is
strongly defended in an able paper in !he "Federalist",
ascribed to Madison; but the article contains nothing pertinent

to the present discussion.

In the case of Fletcher a-ainst Peck, 6 Cranch 87,

when

the constitutionl inhibition was first enforced against a
state governmentJustieJohnson su-'ested some of the fcatures of our problem in his dissenting opinion. "The states
and the United States,"

said he, "are continually le ;islat-

ing on the subject of contracts, prescribing the mode of
authentication, the time vrithin which suits shall be prosecuted for them, in many cases affecting existing contracts
by the laws which they pass and declaring them to have or
lose their effect for want of compliance in the parties wit h
such statutory provisions. Yet 'where to draw the -line or
how to define or limit the words,

"obligation of contracts",

will be found a subject of extreme difficulty."
.Justtice Johnson goes on to illustrate his position further
by claiming that the interpretation undertaken by the court
would deprive the state of the power of eminent domain,
something which,

of course,

the majority of the court had

no notion of doing. See on this point, Garrison against the
City of New York, 21 Wallace 196, where it is held that:
"In the proceeding to.condemn property for public use there
is nothing in the nat re of a contract."

THE RIGHT

AND THE R12EDY DISTINGISHED.

The difficulties suggested by the constit'7tional dele-gateS and by JusticeJohnson first came before the court in
the case of Sturges a,,ainst Crovninshield, 4 Wheaton 122,
and Ogden against Sanders, 12 Wheaton 213. They arose under
the state bankrupt acts and settled the law in reg'ird to
the poer of the states to pass such statutes in the absence
of a national bankrupt act. It was in these cases that an
attempt was first made to draw a distinction between the
obligation of a contract and the remedy upon it. In the former case Juftt

'arshall said: "The distinction between the

obligation of the contract a-'d the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation has been taken it the
bar and exists in the nature of things. Witholt impairing
the obligation of the contract the remedy certainly may be
modified as the wisdom of the nation may direct. Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment for not performing
his contract or may be allowed as a means of inducing him
to perform it. But the state may refuse to inflict this pl Lishment or may withhold this means and leave the contract
in full force. Imprisonment for debt is no part of the contract and simply to release the prisoner does not release
oblgaton
its obligation.

#

A

/ By way
of
y
of analog~y the sta.tutes

litpitations and a.-ainst usury have been referred to in

ar-

gument and'it has been supposed that the construction of
the Constitution which this opinion raaintains would apply t,
them also and.therefore must be too extensive to be correct.
They rather establish that certain circumstances shall
amount to evidence that the contract has been performed thriL
dispense with its performance."
Justice Marshall went somewhat further in the case of Ogden
against Sanders, supra,

"In prescribin

the evidence which

shall be received in its courts," said he, "and the effects
of thit evidence, the state is exercising its acknowledged
poiers. It is likewise in the exercise of its legitimate
powers when it

regulates the remedy and mode of procedUre

in its courts." He goes on to declare that a state may abolish all courts, "if it be crazy enourh to do so", and continues:
holds

"If it leaves the obligation untouched but withthe remedy, or affords one that is merely nominal,

it is like all other cases of misgovernment and leaves the
debtor still liable to his creditor should he be found, or
should his property be found, where the law affords a remody."
It has often been remarked that Marshall never cited authorities; but it does not follow that he never consulted
them. In introducing the dissertation above outlined he

says:

"fLa, has been defined by a .,rriter whose definitions

eso ecia11,7 have been a theme of almost universal pane;yric2
to be 'a rule of civil cond--ct nrescribo4 br the Suprermie
power of a state-'

P.lackstone,

VIIl. I,

"1 The definition

paije 52. On 'he very next page occurs a

passage which Marshall, to
had in mind,

luoted is Lound in

i moral cer-tainty) hiad rend and

when he -irote the above.

The great Fnli3n

commentator divides all la,,s into three parts,

declaratorr,

directory and remedial; and of !he last division,

on pa-e

55 he says: "The remedial part of a liw is so necessary a
consequence of the former twuo that laws must be very vape
and uncertain without it.

For in vain vwould rights be de-

clared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no
method of securing or asserting those rights 'rhen wrongfully
withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly ,ihen wie
speak of the protection of the law."
It is interesting for once to be able to trace

Justice

Marshall's thought to its fountain head; and though the distinction he attempted to draw between the obligation of a
contract and the remedy upon it has seriously embarassed
his successors, he doubtless would have been the last man
to follow his theory to its logical conclusion. The remedy
for a breach of contract is just as essential to the obligation of that contract as is the remedial part of a law to

its binding force. Any contract might be rendered nugUtory
by takin; the remedy thereon away or,

as Justiceiarshall su-

gests, making it "merely nominal". It is urged, though with
diffidencethat
and fell

Justice Marshall

into error.

suid more than he intended

le attempted to explain certain powers

of the legislature over contracts on the theory he advanced.
It is believed that they are all explainable on other and
less dangerous grounds. We will therefore proceed to examine
each instance in which the legislature has been said to have
exercised a power to impair contracts by altering the remedy, with view to determine whether such a result has, in
fact been accomplished.

S LATUTES OF LIMITATION.
When Justice Marshall drew his distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy upon it,

a statute of

limitations was regarded by the courts as a mere rule of evidence, a rebuttable presumption, a defense to be regarded
as more or less dishonorable. Lord Mansfield held the
slightest acknowledgment sufficient to take the case out of
the statute.

He gives these illustrations of words that are

sufficient: "as saying, 'Prove your debt and I will pay youj
'I am ready to account, but nothing is due you;'

and much

slighter acknowledgments than these will take the case out
of the statute."
This was the state of the law when a statute of limitations, applied to prior contracts, was conceded to be constitutional. Since then there has been a marked change in the
construction of such laws by the courts and such enactments
came to be regarded as "statutes of repose." III Parsons on
Contracts, page 63; Edwards against Kearsey, 96 U. S. 595.
Some of the state courts have recently gone a step further
and held that a statute of limitations, to all intents and
purposes pays the debt. Board of Education against Blodgett,
155 Ill. 441. Thus from a mere rule of evidence a statute
of limitations has come to be a part of the substantive law.

It is of an anomalous character; and is rather to be regarded as an exception to a general rule than as an illustration of the opposite rule.
But the operation of such a statute upon prior contracts
is confined by the courts within very narrow limits, as will
be seen from an examination of a few leadinf- cases.
In Terry against Anderson, 95 U. S. 634, an act of the
that
Georgia legislature, requiring all claims accruing bore
the close of the warshould be sued upon within nine months
from the date of the actor be forever barred, was held constitutionalJusticWaite said in his opinion: "The business
interests of the entire people of the state had been overwhelmed by a calamity common to all. Society demanded that
an extraordinary effort be made to get rid of old embarassments and permit a reorganization upon the new order of
things. This clearly presented a case for legislative interference within the just influence of constitutional lit-itations. For this purpose the obligation of old contracts ,

-

could not be impaired but their prompt enforcement could be
insisted upon or their abandonment claimed."
In Mitchell against Clar.k,
"It

110 U. S. 643, the court said:

has been repeatedly held that a statute of limitation

which reduces materially the time within which suit may be
commenced, though passed after the contract was made, is not

void if a reasonable time is left for the enforcement of the
contract by suit before the statute bars that right."1
In Sbhn against Waterson, 17 Wallace 596, and Koshkong
against Boston, 104 U. S. 695, statutes shortening the time
within which actions were to be brought on prior contracts
were upheld as reasonable.
But when the legislature

of Virginia,

as one of its

se-

ries of many efforts to avoid the receipt of coupons on the
state bonds in payment of taxes,

declared that all outstand-

ing coupons must be presented in this way within a year or
be barred; and it appeared that the bonds were held in all
parts of the union; and that the purpose of the legislature
was to impair a substantial right of creditor~and not merely to make them exercise due diligence in the prosecution
of their remedies; the Supreme court was prompt to declare
the limitation unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
In re Brown, 135 U. S. 701.
It is believed that the above cases clearly demonstrate
that a statute of limitations cannot be permitted to deprive
creditors of any substantial right under their contracts;
and that as soon as such rights are impaired, the statute
inmediately becomes unconstitutional. It is also urged that
the fact that such a statute may be retroactive at all is to
be explained upon historical grounds. In any event, the utmost that a legislature can do is to insist that existing

15

rights be speedily enforced.

It

must be confessed that the

court seems to have reserved to itself a wide discretion
and has shown a disposition at times to test the constitutionality of legislation by the purpose for which it appeav4
ed to be passed.

BANKRUPT LA'.VS.
The limits of the power of the states to pass bankrupt
laws were defined in

the cases of Sturge.s against Crownin-

shield and Ogden against Sanders, supra. It was there held
that the states might pass such laws in the absence of a
United States bankrupt act; but such laws, it was held,
could not operate upon prior contracts, nor upon contracts
between citizens of different states. The power thus conceded was so very limited that few state bankrupt acts have
since been passed. It is a little curious to notice that the
very cases in which the distinction which has since proved
so troublesome was first drawn, a state law which acts
wholly on the creditor's remedy, was denied any retroactive
effect whatever- The truth of the matter is that the final
decision was in the nature of a compromise, in the Sanders
case, and not one of the opinions therein written can be
regarded as expressing the views of a majority of the court.
The bar was for a long time puzzled to know just what the
case decided and the court was obliged to refer back to that
decision and explain itself

in a subsequent case.

IMPRI SONM[iT FOR DEBT.
But while holding that state bankrupt acts could have no
retroactive effect, the cases above cited decided that state
insolvent laws, which released the person of the debtor,
were Good, though retroactive. And. in Mason ag-ainst Haile,
12 Wheaton 370, it was held that a state law might abolish
imprisenment for 'debt altogether. The power thus acknowledged has often been regarded

as the exere.ise of an author-

ity to impair contracts by an alteration of the remedy. But
as .Justice Marshall pointed out, imprisonment for debt may be
reigrded either as a punishment for non payment or as a part
of the remedy for not paying. Even in the latter viewv the
denial of the remedy may certainly be classified as an exertion of the Police Power.
In reality, however, the power rests upon historical
rather than theoretical grounds. The debtor has from the
earliest times been accorded the right, by the clemency of
the law-making power, to free his person by the surrender
of his goods. This is clearly pointed out by Chancellor
Kent, I Kent Com. 422:
"The cessio bonorum of the Ro :.an law, introduced by Julius Caesar, and which prevnils at present in most parts of
the continent of Europe, only exempted the person of the

debtor from imprisonment.

It

did not release

or dischar-e

the debt or exempt the future acquisitions of the debtor
from execution for the debt. The English statutes of 32 Geo.
II, coumonly called the 'Lord's act',
English statutes of 33 Geo. III,

and the more recent

1 Geo. IV, and 5 Geo. IV,

have gone no further than to discharge the debtor's person;
and it

may be laid down as the law of Germany,

France,

Hol-

land, Scotland, England, etc., that the insolvent laws are
not more extensive than the cessio bonorurn of the Roman law"
In sustaining the legislative power to abdlish imprisonmont for debt, the constitutional interpreters merely held
that the law was as it

always had been. For futher cases in

point see: Beers against Houghton, 9 Peters 32); Cook
against Moffat,
714.

5 Howard 295; Penniman's case,

103 U.

S.

RECORDITG ACTS.
The power

of the

legislature to pass recording acts

has been cited by many judges who hive so'ight to distinguish
the obligation of a contract and the remedy upon it; and
all the text books class such laws among "Laws affecting
the remedy." But ordinarily a recording act in no way concerns the parties to a contract. As between them it makes
not the slightest difference whether or not the instrument
were ever recorded. Such acts are usually for the purpose of
giving notice of the transaction to third parties, to prevent fraudulent conveyances and to protect subsequent creditors, purchasers and mortgagees in good faith.
In Jackson against Lamphire, 3 Peters 290, the court says
"It

is within the undoubted power of state legislatures to

pass recording acts by which the elder grantee Ahall be
postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded
within the limited time; and the power is the same whether
the deed is

dated before or afterithe passage of the record-

ing act. Though the effect of such a law is to render the
prior deed fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser,

it is not a law impairing the obligation of contracts."
In Vance against Vance, 108 U. S. 314, a Louisiana law

requiring the registration of "tacit" mortgages was upheld.

In Louisiana against New Orleans, 102 7. S. #OJ,an act requiring prior judgments against the municipality to be registered before issuing process for their collection was held
constitutional on the

-round th at no rights of the creditor

were affected. This statute is of a different character
from most recording acts in that it operates upon the relations of the parties to the contract. It may be compared to
a law requiring judgments to be docketed or other regulation
pf procedure, which, while operating upon the contract, is
merely formal in its requirments.

But the primary purpose

of these regulations is the protection of third parties and
the proper regrlation of the rival claims of creditors.
If they did not accomplish this result and were made the
means of seriously hampering the collection of debts, under
the doctrine here contended for they would be unconstitutional.
In the matter of tax sale deeds the contract is between
the state and the purchaser by which the former practically
farms out its taxes for collection. Laws which restrict the
oppressive operation of these contracts have been favored
by the courts, for no form of contract is more obnoxious to
the judiciary. The Supreme court of New Hampshire once half
seriously pronounced a tax sale deed to be "prima facie
void." This may afford an explanation of the somewhat svfo(p-

ing observations of Justice Miller, n Curtis a- ainst
13 Wallace 68, where he says:

"It is

Whitney

one of the contingen-

ces to which parties look now in making a'large class of
contracts, that they may be affected in

mny ways by state

and national legislation." The act under consideration in
that case required holders of. tax titles to give notice to
the occupant of the land before proceedinS to perf,- ct his
title.

The idea of notice to third parties, protection to

third parties , is the prirhary notion in all the acts of
this description . They are therefore not to be relied upon
as authority for supporting any law which affects the substantial rights of parties under a contract by the regulation of the remedy upon it.

RULES OF EVIDE1iCE.

As a state must establish courts for the administration
of'justice, so it

must regulate the terms,

proceedings, con-

stitutionand the like of those courts. In doing so it must
regulate the met.hods in which contractua! rights may be enforced. By so doing can it impose conditions which render
prior contracts less valuable? The confusion of the subject
and the difficulty
here:

It is

of answering the question exist just

at this

point

that the legislative

and judicial

functions of the government meet. The constitutional inhibition

is

upon !dhe legislature

and not upon the

Courts and not legislatures
dence;

but it

is

courts to alter

have built

the province

dourts.

up the rules of evi-

of legislatures and not of

them.

But when, in the exercise of this authority, a state
legislature

has attempted

to make it

contracts and thus to embarass the
Supreme court has not hesitated

more difficult

to prov

collection of debts,

the

to declare the legislation

unconstitutional. For instance, in Walker against Whitehead.
16 Wall 317,

where the Georgia

the plaintiff must
in

order to establish

to be inoperative

legislature

provided that

show that he hdd paid taxes on his debt
his cause
as to prior

of action,

debts.

the la-

was held

Here %.ris- rule of

evidence affecting the remedy on the contract and the remedy only; b it notwithstanding the distinction drawn bet:leon
the remedy and the obligation of a contract .JuV(;4 Swayne
declared in his opinion that "the laws which exist at the
time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is
to be performed, enter into and form a part of it."
In the case of Wilmington Railroad a:ainst King, 91 U. S.
3, a law passed by the legislature of North Carol:na was
under consideration. It provided that in actions on contracts made during the war the measure of damages should be
the actual value of the property bought and sold and not
the value of the Confederate money at the date of the transaction. The Supreme Court of the United States had, in previous decisions, held that contracts not made in furthrence of rebellion were good though payment was to be made
in Confederate currency; and that the measure of damages
should be the value of the currency at the time of the contract. This rule often worked hardship as the standard of
value fixed was fluctuating with the fortunes of the war;
and it reduced the plaintiff's claim to ari absurdly low
figure in the case in point. The statute would seem to be
merely a rule for the guidance of juries and clearly within
the power to control procedure, if such a power exist, but
the Supreme court, with but one dissenting voice, pronounceL

the law unconstitutional.
finger against Nenney,
ilar

A like decision w,-is made in Ef-

115 U.

S.

566,

with regard to a sim-

act passed by t;he legislature of Virginia.
There .iis no element of repudiation in these statutes;

their purpose was fair and honest; but they sought to affect

substantial rights under contracts by a modification

of the rules
stitutionil.

,overnin7 the remedy and were therefore uncon-

LA.TS CHANGIIG FORMS OF ACTION.
Can the effectiveness of a contract be impaired by a sub-

sequent
There

change in the form of action for its

are several

cases,

it

must be

enforcement?

confessed,

which seem

to hold that a form of action less speedy and effective may
be substituted for

the one existing

tract. In Tennesee against

at

the time of the con-

Sneed, 96 U.

S. 62, it was held

that an act of the state legislature requiring the payment
of taxes under protest and a suit within thirty days thereafter does not leave a party without an adequate remedy for
asserting his right to pay his state taxes in certain bills
made receivable therefor

under the charter -ranted to the

Bank of Tennesee, in the year 1338; but which bills the collector refused to accept.
This decision was followed by that of Antoni against
Greenhow, 107 U.

S. 769, the first

of the famous Virginia

coupon cases. It will be remembered that Virginia funded
its state debt by the issuance of bonds, making the coupons
thereon receivable for taxes. This expedient

so depleted

the revenue of the state, thaU every legislative device was
exhausted to defeat

the right

thus -ranted.

One of these

schemes was to require the collector to refuse the coupons,
the payment of the tax under protest

and an expensive and

involved liti-ation to establish the right

to have

the cou-

pon received. This law was upheld; but in a subsequent case,
where the taxpayer, after the refustil of his coupon, simply
did nothing, and the collector sold his property to satisfy the claim for taxes, the couirt held the collector personally liable in conversion. It is difficult to unravel the
logical tangle in which the court involved itself in order
to arrive at these decisions; but the task is foreign to the
subject in hand.
The remedies afforded the bondholder in Tennesee agains
Sneed and Antoni against

-reenhovi were forms of action pre-

scribed by a sovereignty in consenting to be sued by a subject. In both instances the legislature mi!ht have takenaway
the remedy th~is afforded altogether and still be free from
constitutional restraint. Though both cases are frequently
cited to maintain the proposition that a creditor can be
embarassed by an alteration of the remedy, it is clearly
through a misconception of the principle upon ohich they
must have been decided.
But there is a recent case which cannot so e:sily be explained away.

I-t is

that of the Fourth National Bank against

Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747,

There a statute of Rhode Island

gave a process against stockholders, property on a judgment
against a corporation. The court sustained a subsequent act

requiring that the remedy against the corpor(ition should
first be exhausted, and that a fresh suit should then be
brou';ht against the stockholder. It must be confessed that
this case upholds a statute which takes from the creditor
his right to the more effective remedy at his command %wrhen
the contract was made; and upon -:ihich he may have relied in
Siving credit.

To be sure his cl ,im -,-ainst the stockholder

is not taken away but is merely postponed; and the case
undoubtedly proceeded on the theory thaft the remedy substituted for the old one did not impair any substantial rights
under the contract. The decision, however, borders upon ver'
doubtful territory and wais ono of the authorities
relied upon by the Kansas court in

chiefly

Beverly against Barnitz.

-- , ".

LAWS MAKING DEFECTIVE CO1T7RACTS VALID.
But,

it

is

contracts

urged,

a legislature

retrospectively

may certainly

by altering

rules

affect

of evi.ence;

for

a crime may be proved by evidence incompetent when it was
oommittd;

and the law making such evidence competent is

held nnt to be ex post facto. Hopt against Utah, 110 U.

S.

574, True enough. A crime is no less a crime because there
stands

some technical difficulty in proving it; nor is

a

contract the less a contract because the evidence necessary
to establish it is incompetent. A valid contract, however,
may not be rendered invalid by a law rendering it impossible
of proof. But an invalid contract may be rendered enforcible by such subsequent

legislation.

In 'Saterlee against Mathewson, 2 Peters 412,
act

wais sustained which cured a defective

ington said:

"Should a state

ciples of law, that

titleJustice

vihere an
Wash-

declare, contrary to the prin-

contracts founded upon an illegal or an

immoral consideration, whether in existence at the time of
passing the statute, or which hereafter be entered inlto,
should nevertheless be valid and binding upon the parties;
all would admit the retrospective character of such an enactment,

and that the effect of it was to create a contract

between the parties where none had previously existed; blit

it Surely could not be contended that to create a contract
and to destroy and impair one

mean the same thing. The la..;

was retrospective, but did not impair the obligation."
This doctrine was ag-ain asserted in Watson a-inst Mercer, 8 Peters 88. It was upon this principle thit the cIse
of Elwell against Daggs, 108 U. S. 150, w'Js decided. Here
the Texas legislature abolished the usury laws. A contract
usurious under the law of its date was held to have been
perged of its illegality by a subsequent repeiling, statute.
It wvas this prihciple also that controlled the decision in
Campbell against Holt, 115 U. S. 620. Here a statute of limr
itations had been ropealed, and a debt, which -,ould h-ive
been barred under the law existing at the date of the contract, was held to be enforcible. The court drew a distinction betwreen statutes of limitation and of prescription. The
one, it held,merely afforded the debtor a defense which
might be taken .away by the power that gave it. In the other1,
property had been acquired by a grant presumed; and to take
that away would be to take away property without due process
of law. This doctrine is contrary to the view of 'he matter
taken by the Illinois court

in Board of Education against

Blodgett, 155 Ill. 144,
1),rhere it is held that a statute of
limitations practically pays the debt, and therefore cannot
be repealed withoat taking a.vy the debtor's proper' j.

The

position of the Supreme Court of the United States would
appear to be the sounder in reason and authority; but as a
decision of a state court, upholding the Constitution
afainst its

own law is

not appealable,

the question mqust

remain an open one.
There can be no doubt, however, that were a rule of evidonce altered so as to impair contracts instead of perfecting them, the legislation would be unconstitutional. No
usury statute could make prior contracts usurious. Ogden
against Sanders, at page 348; and, as already seen no
statute of limitations can absolutely bar a prior debt.

EXFEPT ION LAWS.
The authority of a state legislature to affect contracts
by exempting property from execution is frequently asserted.
The principal authority for 'his proposition is a dictum
of Chief Justice Taney in Bronson against Kinzie, 1 Howard
312, where he saiys:

" A state may, if it thinks proper, di-

rect that the necessary implements of agriculture or the
tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture shall, like v earing apparel, not be liable
to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description
have always been considered

in every civilized community

as properly belonging to the remedy to be executed or not
by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy
or humanity."
But in the case of Edwards-against Kearsey, 96 U. S.

595,

where the legislature of North Carolina attempted to exempt
property to the amount of

a thousand dollars or more and

make this exemption retroactive, the Supreme court declared
in no uncertain voice that prior contracts could not be
affected by any such subtk'uge,

and Swayne,

in

co:-.:enting

on the doctrine as laid down by Judge Taney , said:

"The

remedy subsisting in a state vihen and where the contract
is made, and to be performed, is a part of its obligation;

and any subsequent law of the state which so affects that
remedy as substantially to impair

and lessen the value of

the contract is forbidden by the Constitution of the United
States, and it therefore void. J#

-

# #

The learned Chief

Justice seems to have had in mind the maxim 'de minimis'.
Upon no other tro,:nd can any exemption be justified.
A similar rule was laid down in the earlier case of Gunn
against Barry, 15 Howard 610. There the nw Georgia constitution, approved by Congress at the end of the war, gave to
debtors a greater exemption that had been allowed

under

existing statutes. This was held unconstitutional as to
prior debts, notwithstanding congressional approval of the
new constitution. In that case Judge Swayne said:"The legal
remedies for the enforcement of a contract, which belong to
it at the time and place where it was made, are a part of
its obligation. A state may changee them, provided the
change involves no impairmentof a substantial right. If the
provision of the constitution or the legislative act of a
state fall

within the cate-ory last mentioned,

they are to

that extent, utterly void. They are, for all the purposes
of the contract which they impair, as if they had never existed. The constitutional provision and statute here in
question are clearly within that category and are therefore
void."

The truth of the matter is

that the exemption of articles

of necessity for inmmediate s)bsistance, may be protected,
not because of any pover to

impair

contracts by an alter-

ation of the remedy, but upon the same principle that imprisonment for debt may be abolished.

The stern common law,

which stripped the wife of everything else, left her paraphernalia, and in a like manner the state, in the exercise
of its Police Power, may refuse to imprison the debtor, or
to allow the creditor to turn him naked upon the community,
to become a charge upon the taxpayer. But this power, while
protecting the debtor from being deprived of his means of
earning a livelihood, can, under no pretense be 'extended
to deprive the creditor of any of his just and substantial
rights.

DIVORCE LAVS.
The power of the legislature to grant divorces has been
attempted to be classified under the head of an alteration
of the remedy. In the Dartmouth College case, 4 Wheaton at
page 323,JusticeStory

says:

"A general law regulating di-

vorcesfrom the contract of marriage, like a law regulating
remedies in other cases of breach of contract, is not necessaril y a law impairin= the obligation of such a contract.
It may be the only effectu&A mode of enforcing the obliga-__
tion of a contract on both sides. A law punishinog a breach
of contract by imposing a forfeiture of the rights acquired
under it; or dissolving it because the mutual obligations
were no longer observed, is in no correct sense a law impairing the obligations of a contract. Could a law compelling a specific performance by giving a new remedy be justly
deemed an excess of legislative powef4 ?"
Of course the above was written before P.Xr.

Bishop had

pointed out the distinction between the contract to marry
and the so called "contract of marriage."

The latter

is

now held to be not a contract but a "status"; and the power
of the legislature to regulate that status,

whatever its

limits may be, has nothing to do with our discussion.

LAWS ABOLISHING THE TAXING POWER.
One of the most frequent attempts by legislatures to
defeat contracts by taking away the remedy upon them is in
the case of the obligations of municipalities. In each instance the attempts have proved futile. The favorite device
has been to repeal acts which empowered the ci'ty to levy
taxes to meet its debts. The leading cases on this subject
are: New Jersey against Wilson, 7 Cranch 164; Van Hoffman
against the city of Quincey, 4 Wallace 535; Louisiana againt
Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 300; Nelson against St Martin's Parish,
111 U.5. 721; Mobile against Watson, 116 U.S. 289; and Siebert against Lewis, 122 U. S. 284.
In the case last cited the town issued railroad bonds,
and contracted that the taxes to meet them should be

levied

in a. certain way. The court held that the taxes could be
levied in no other manner.
In the Van Hoffman case,Justice Swayne,'.,ho seems to have
given our problem more attention than any other jurist of
his bench, acknowledged the difficulty of the subject and
the embarassment caused by the earlier dicta, as follows:
"It is competent for states to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise as they see fit, provided
that no substantial right as secured by the contract is

thereby impaired. No attempt has been made to fix definitely
the line between alterations of the remedy which are to be
deemed to be deemed legitimate and those which, under the
form of modifyin- the remedy impair substantial rights.
Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances.
Whenever the result last mentioned is produced the act is
within the prohibition of the Constitution and is to that
extent void. If these doctrines were res integrae the consistency and soundness of the reasoning which maintains a
distinction between the contract and the remedy, or to speak
more accurately, between the remedy and the other parts of
the contract, might, perhaps, well be doubted; I Kent 456,
Sedg. Stat.

Cons. Law 652,JusticeVrashington's dissenting

oph.ion, 12 Wheaton 379. But they rest in this court upon
a foundation of authority too firm to be shaken; and they
are supported by such an array of judicial names that it is
hard. for the mind not to feel constrained to believe that
they are correct. The doctrine on the subject established
by the latest adjudications of this court, render the distinction rather one of form than of substance.

J

In the case of Louisiana asainst Pillsbury supra, justice
Field said:

"The only ground on which a change of remedy,

existing when a contract was made, is permissible without
impairment of the contract, is that a new und adequate and

efficacious remedy be substituted for that which is superseded."

In the case of Loulsiana against the Mayor of New

Orleans, where the collection of a judgment for damages for
mob violence was rendered impossible, through a statute
repealing the taxing power, the law was upheld because the
right arose out

of tort and the constitutional inhibition

did not apply.
It is needless to review the other cises under this head.
They all maintain the doctrines above laid down; and
the court

had

always been equally consistent the problem of this

thesis could scarcely have arisen.

STAY LAWS.
Some of the state courts have dealt with laws granting
a stay of execution on Judgments beyond reasonable limits.
No case of the sort seems to have been passed upon by the
Supreme court of the United States; but it

is safe to as-

sume, in view of the cases already cited, that no such law
would there be sustained. A court in the exercise of -its
judicial power mpy doubtless, in its sound discretion, grant
a stay of executiorywithout the aid of statute. But it may
once more be remarked that the constitutional restraint applies to the legislative and not to the judicial department
of the government.
In view of the cases

already cited it would also appear

that such a law might be sustained did it postpone the creditor for a time so short that his substantial rights could
not be said to be impaired. The courts, in all these cases,
seem to apply that flexible yardstick which they call "reasonableness."

REGULATION OF FORECLOSURE SALES.
Three cases, all decided betveon 1840 and 1845, pass upon
statutes similar to that which gave rise

to the litigation

in Beverly against Barnitz. In the case of Bronson against
Kinzie, 1 Howard 312, the legislature

of Illinois extended

the time in which mortgagors might redeem and also required
that the mortgaged property should be appraised and thaton
the foreclosure sale, the property should brin- two-thirds
of the value thus fixed or the sale would be of no effect.
Chief Justice Taney, in the course of an opinion holding
the law invalid, said:

"Although a new remedy may be deemed

less convenient than the old one, and may in some degree
render the recovery of debts more tardy and difficult, yet
it will not follow that the law is unconstitutional. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according
to the will of the state, provided that the alteration does
not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that
effect is produced, it is immaterial

whether it is done by

acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself. In
either case it is prohibited by the Constitution.
"If such rights may be added to the original contract by
subsequent legislation, it would be difficult to say at
what point they must Stop. An equitable interest

in the

premises may in like manner be conferred upon others, and
the right to redeem so prolonged as to deprive the mort-agee
of his security, by rendering the property unsaleable for
anything like its value. This law gives to the mortgagor
and to the judgment creditor an equitable estate in the

)ro-

mises to which neither of them would have been entitled
under the contract, and these new interests are directly
and materially in conflict with those which the mortgagee
acquired when the mortgage was made-"
In a dissenting ojtnion Just'iceMcLean pointed out some
of the inconsistencies in the reasoning of the chief justice
He said:

"Where shall this

judicial discretion find a lim-

it? There must be some limit. If the legislature may not
a

modify the remedy at their discretion in regard to existing contracts,

they must be prohibited from making any

change. Any departure from this rule of construction must
depend upcn

the arbitrary decision of courts, and each

court in this respect may exercise its own discretion until
the question is settled by this tribunal."
In the case of McCracken against Hayward, 2 Howard 608,
Justice Baldwin stated the rule as follows:

"The obligation

of a contract consists in its,: binding force on the party
who makes it. This depends upon the laws in existence when
it is made; these are necessarily referred to in all con-

tracts and form a part of them as the measure of the obligation to

perform them by the one party and the right

ac-

quired by the other. # # # # If any subsequent law affect
to diminish the duty o!.impair the right,
bears on the obligation of one party or
the other."

i.t necessarily
to

the injury of

This was also a case where the statute sought

to extend the equity of redemption in the mortgagor.
In the case of the Lessees of Gantley against Ewing, 3
Howard 707-, JusticeCatron said:

"The new remedy prescribed

by the act of 1841, changed the contract and required, amon
other things, that the mortgaged premises should

not be

sold to satisfy the debt unless they were first valued
one-half that value

and

.:-as bid for them. If the legislature

could make this alteration in the contract and in !.he decree
enforcing it,

so it

could declare that the property shou'ld

bring its entire value, or that

it should not be

sold -t

all, thereby impairing or defeating the obligfition, under
the disguise of regulating the remedy."
The three

cases above cited, for over fifty years, re-

mained the main *1uthorities on the recoeds of our national
tribunal in the matter of laws affecting foreclosure sales
and extending the mortgagor's equity of redemption. During
that time a radical change has taken place in nearly all
the states, in 1,he law of rortgages and in the nature of the

mortgage contract.

When ihese cases were decided a mortg'ie

was an estate in the lands,

a deed with a defeasance,

and

the mortrgagee held the legal title. When he sold the property on forecldsure he sold his title, the purchaser on
foreclosure

stepped into his shoes;

acquire a perfect title

by strict

or the mort.-asee

foreclosure.

It

could

was con-

tended by the Kansas court that these authorities of half a
century ago were authorities no longer, olin- tq the change
in

the nature of the mortgage contract.

It

was contended

that since the mortgage debt is now the main thingbooked to,
and the effect of the agreement upon the land merely that of
a lien, the contract relation no longer exists

when the

mortgage has been foreclosed, the land sold and a deficiency
judgment taken.
In addition to the cases reviewed under this sub-division, Howard against Bugbee, 24 Howard 461, and Brine against
Insuran'ce company, 96 U.

S. 627, are cited as authorities

by Judge Shiras in Beverly against Barnitz, but they are
similar in purport to those reviewed above.

MERGER OF CONTRACTS IfT JUDGIMNT.

A puzzling question now presents itself for consideration. Is the mortgage contract merged in 'he decree or ter)y the foreclosure

minated

Ne-u York must bear in

saleZ

In

mind that in

it

consideri:
Kansas,

Illinois

we

in

and

many other states, the sale on foreclosure does not cu.t off
the equity as it

does here.

A statute which affects the

rights of the purchaser and mortga :ee only cannot very y-ell
be said to impair a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee. If

the statute wure applied only to mortgages which

had been already foreclosed, the mortgagee would not be af-.
fected and the law,

if

unconstitutional, wo- ld be so on the

ground that it took away the purchaser's property vlitho t
due process. If the law apply to existing mortgages not
already foreclosed it is hard to see why any additional burden imposed upon the land, or any extension of the equity
of redemption does not act directly on the mort gage contractS
because the land must be sold subject to these ne: conditions wich did not exist at the time the mortgage was made.
It is difficult to understand howr new privileges can be
conferred upon the mortgagor without in some iray impairing
the contractual rights of the mortgagee.
If,

however,

the stat-te does not impose nel, conditions

subject to which the land is sold, but operates only upon
the judgment

and in

no vay on the contract the lan

is

SuS-

tained. A couple of cases will illustrate this principle.
In the case of Morley asgainst the Lake shore,
162,

the court held, that;

"after the ciuse of

a tort or a broken contract,

not itself

pr

e

1416 U.

S.

actionwhether

scribing interost

until payment, shall have been merged into a judgment;
whether interest

shall accrue upon the judgment is

a matter

not of contract between the parties, but of legislative discretion; which is free, so far as the United States Constitution is concerned, to provide for interest as a penalty o;
liquidated damages for non-payment of the judgment, or not
to do so."
This theory was also applied in the case of Insurance
company against

Cushman,

108 U.

S.

51,

where,

by the law in

force at the date of the contract the mortgagor might redeem within a certain time after foreclosure by the payment
of the purchase price plus ten percent, a statute was upheld which reduced the rate pf interest to be paid on redemption

to eight per cont.JilsticeHarlan

laid it

down that

the mortgnge was mergeqin the decree or at legist when the
sale occurred; that the purchaser at the sale was entitled
to the interest on his purchase money as provided by law
at the date of the sale; but not

as provided by law at the

date of the mortgage.

Ile held that the right of a purchas-

er to draw a certain rate of interest on the purchase money
in case of redemption was no part of the mortgage contract.
The court held that the fact the reduction of interest might
affect, the value of the land on foreclosure sale was 1oo
remote a contingency to be regarded.
This case was one of Lhose most strongly relied upon by
the Kansas court and it was thus distinguished by Justice.Sh
r~is in his opinion in Beverly against Barnitz:

"The case of

Cushman against the Insurance company does not collide with
the previous and subsequent cases. There the new statute
did not lessen the duty of the mortgagor to pay what he had
contracted to pay; nor affect the time of payment; nor affect any remedy the mortgagee had by existin) law for the
enforcement of his contract."
Now, if a state legislature should extend the time in
which mortgagors might redeem after sale on foreclosure,
it is hard to see how this case can be distinguished. In
such event the duty of the mortgagor to pay what he had
contracted to pay would not be lessened, nor would the time
of payment nor the remedy of the mortgagee under existing
law be affected, i'n any other way than it wvould be by othe,
statute upheld in

the Cushman case.

It

was stated:atithec

outset that the decision of the Supreme court by no means

closed the door against
litigation,
open.
in

and it
It

is

is

believed',

a revival 'of the question in

future

just here that the door seems to be
however,

that the doctriie laid down

the Cushman case will ndt be extended to apply to any-

thing but regulations of interest on decretal sales. It is
believed that an attempt to reach the mortgage contract by
laws affecting the proceedings after merger will be defeated on the theory that they do render the property less saleable,

and thus impair the secirity of the mortgagee.

It

was

not obvious in the Cushman case that such would be the result of the' statute there under consideration, and the case
may be hereafter distinguished on that ground. This, however, is a matter of pure gpeculation.

BEVERLY AGAITSY' BARNI Z.
Every leadin- authority among the decisions of the national

tribunal,

which bears upon the problems suggested by

the Kansas mortgage

c'ises,

has now been discussed under the

various subdivisions of this thesis. It would have been a
hopeless

task to trace the fluctuations

upon the question.

of

the state

courts

We are therefore ready to apply such

principles as we have been able to elucidate to the facts
there in litigation.
In 1893 the legislature of the state of Kansas passed an
act regulating the procedure in the foreclosure of mortga ,es.
Among other things it
iff
a

provided that on

of the mortgaged premises,
"certificate

plete title

of sale",
until

the sale by the sher-

the purchaser

sho-uld be given

which would not ripen into a com-

eighteen months thereafter.

Meanwhile the

mortgagor was to remain in possession, making no account of
rents and profits,
period.

and might redeem at any time within that

The holders of -the mortgage

securities

immediately

proceeded to test the constitutionality of thes6
In

the cases of Watkins against

Barnitzithe matter was brought
Supreme

Glen and Beverly against

to issue.

court of Kansas held the statute

as to mortgages made before

its

enactments

passage.

In

AP-il,

1895,

the

unconstitutional,
But the decision

was not unanimous; and before the next term there was a
change in the personell'v of the court. A re-argument was
granted in the lfitter cise and the former decision was reversed.

The effect of this decision was to keep mortgagors

in possession throuighout the state, pending the decision of
the Supreme co-rt of the

United states.

Chief Judge Martin

in his opinion supporting his views, frankly admitted that
the provision keeping the mortgagor in posession without
accounting for rents and profits was probably indefensible;
but urged that the rest of the law should be sustained. Had
this been his decision the question whether the equity of
redemption could thus be extended would have been fairly
presented. But his.court sustained the whole statute, though
admitting one phase of it to be unconstitutional. When the
Supreme Court of the United States came to reverse this decision, as of course,
stances,

it

it

was bound to do

--nder

the circum-

cited the cases reviewed under the s'Ibhead,

"Regulation of Foreclosure Sales," distinguished the cases
under "Merger of Contracts," and remarked that, under the
Kansas statute "What is sold is not the estate 9ledged,
a remainder,

an estate subject to 'he

but

possession for eigh-

teen months of another person, who is under no obligation
to account for profits.,,
Had the Kansas court been more honest and less anxious

to protect the temporary interests of

he impoverished i an-

sas farmer; had it declared the portion of the st-itute unconstitutional, which it was obliged to admit could not be
supported under the very authorities upon which it was obliged to rely;

had it been contented to

-resent the prob-

lems of the case fairly to the superior tribunal; the result vio ld have been far more doubtful and the question, at
any rate, wor-ld have been squrarely decided. As it was Judge
Martin's ingen

is reasoning and able argument were doubt-

less regarded as a mere special plea for a statute which
the pleader admitted to be in parts indefensible, the Supreme

court contented itself with deciding no more than it

was obliged to, and the settlement of the more doubtful
phases of the case seems to ?ave been left open for future
litigat ion.
After urging the doctrine of merger discussed elsewhere,
Judge Martin contended that a statute extending the equity
of redemption, in any event, acted only on the remedy, and.
was well within the li its of that power as prescribed by
the authorities. He made the following surmary of the decisions which he regarded as supporting his doctrine:
"If a state legislature may totally abolish

imprison-

ment of the debtor as a means of enforcing payment;
may shorten the statute of limitations;

if it

if it may reasonably

extend and enlarge exemptions of property :from sale for the
payment of debts; if, where coupons are by la,.vz made receiiable for the payment of taxes,

it may require such paymenL

in the fir:t instance in cash, to be afterwards refunded
and the coupons taken up; if it may reduce the rate of interest on redemption from decretal sales; if it may lessen
the interest on former judgments;

if it may require

,he

holder of a tax sale certificate to give three mnonths n; tice
of the time when a tax deed will be applied for; if it may
require transcripts of judgments against a particular city
to be filed in a certain office as a prerequisite for payment; if it may reduce the terms of

court in number and du-

ration; if it may amend the laws as to attachments, garnishments and receivers;,

so as to t'ake away causes there-

for which were before sufficient; if,
ulate

in

short,

it

may re--

at pleasure the modes of proceeding in the courts,

and all this as to existing obligations,

it

is

difficult

to form a process of reasoning vwrhich would forbid it

from

so regulatin- the procedure upon the foreclosure of r.ortgageS,

as to make more definite and certai4he indefinite

estate impliedly
perty,

reserved by every rmortga,-or of real! pro-

and called into active existlence only by '.he fore-

cloz,.5re and which indefinite estate is extrnded by the Federal courts of equity for six months,

in

the first

instance,

and after.ard once

cellor,

oftener,

in

'he

di-crcUion of the chtin-

according uo the circumstances of

he case."

Assuming that the Kansas statute had done no more than
to extend zhe equity of redemption, or even that it left
the moi,'.gcor in possession for eizhteen -2-onths providing
for an accounting by him fou rents and profits,
argument vroulld appear expremely plausible.

But i'

the above
is be-

lieved that each instance of the supposed authority of the
legislature cited by Judge Ma1rtin has been shovm to haive
been exercised -upon grounds other than that of an alteration of the remedy and that even had the Kansas statute been
modified as suggested it could not haive been sustained.

CONCLUSION.
What answer, then, are ':,e now able to give to the question which confronted us at the outset: How far can a legislature affect a contract by alterin- the remedy upon it2
It is believed that ic h7.s been shown that the supreme
court has departed as far as it can from the early distinction drawn between the contract and the remedy, without
actually abolishing it.

The rule seems to be that. a law

which alters the remedy must not impair the contract or
substantially lessen its value. There seems to be a field
between laws which are regarded as substantially impairing
the contract and those which affect it to some extent but
do not lessen the rights of the creditor to any material
degree where judicial discretion may be exercised. The rule
is sometimes stated thus: "Where the act impairs the contract under the disguise of altering the remedy it is void."
It is submitted that, while it is the duty of courts to
determine and interpret the intention of legislatures, they
have no right to concern themselves with the motives which
prompted the legislation. The fact that one law w:is .passed
for the purpose merely of altering procedure, and another
similar law for the Purpose of enabling debtors to repudiate their obligations should not,

it

is

urged,

be the test

of the constitutionality of the respective statutes. It is
submitted, with all due diffidence, that the wide field of
discretion the courts have reserved to themselves in this
matter tends to put

sometimes appea:

them over the legislature;

that Judges

to regard themselves as censors of legis-

lative honor, rather than servants of the legislative will
under the constutition.
The following is

off-red as the best stultement of the

rule governing this whole matter that the vriter has been
able to formulate in view of the decisions:
.VThile it is the duty of the legislature to provide
means for the enforcement of contracts, while it may establish courts and provide rules for their guidance, while it
kay alter those rules and change forms of action, substituting for existing remedies other remedies equally effective, it cannot diminish the value of contracts by rendering their enforcement more difficult. It cannot alter rules
of evidence, extend exemptions, remove taxing powers, or
impose cumbersome restrictions upon forms of procedure and
apply such changes to prior contracts, if thereby the substantial rights of the creditor are diminished,--for the
laws existing at the time the contract is
where it

is

to be performed,

ligation of that contract.'

made,

in the place

are part and parcel of the ob-

